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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
EDDIE HOOGLAND,
By his ·Guardian ad Litem,
Roelof Hoogland,

Plaintiff ,and Appellant,

vs.
THOMAS B. CHILD and C. W.
CHILD, dba THOMAS B.
CHILD & CO., JACK ALDER
and ROBERT R. CHILD, dba
ALDER-CHILD CONSTRUC.
TION CO.,

Case No. 9295

Defendants .and Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT THOMAS B. CHILD
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an appeal by the plaintiff from a Summary Judgment, in favor of all the defendants and
against the plaintiff, No Cause of Action. The record
of appeal consists of the pleadings and material
contained in the appeal cover, the depositions of
the plaintiff, Eddie Hoogland, his pa.rents, Roelof
Hoogland and Louisa Hoogland, and the defendants,
Thomas B. Child, and Robert R. Child.
In the interest of consistency, in our Statement of Facts, when referring to the Record, we
1
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will use the letter "R." Referring to the Hooglands'
depositions, by the letter "H," and the Child depositions by the letter "C."
Pretrial depositions were taken, from which the
following facts appear.
The accident happened on February 18, 1957.
Eddie was 14 years old. (H. 3) He and his parents
'had lived in this country a little over four years.
He was born in Holland. He attended the 7th grade
at the Webster School. (H. 5) On the day of the
accident, he h,ad sloughed school at least part of
the day and gone onto the premises of the 0. P.
Skaggs Store, which adjoins the Thomas B. Child
property on the north. (H. 5, 20) That was sometime in the afternoon.
In order to enter the Child premises, he had to
squeeze through a small place between a fence and
;a building. (H. 11, 20, 21) He wanted to go on the
premises and "try that torch, so I had fifteen cents
with me, and I bought some matches." (H. 15)
The reason he went over to the Child premises was,
he guessed he liked the place, the rocks and that.
(H. 10) He went through a hole into the premises.
When he saw a man come out, he just hid behind
something. (H. 20)
Mter he got through the opening and entered
the Child premises, he saw the can and the wood
or lumber. (H. 11) He built a fire about a foot
2
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from a stack of lumber, near which the barrel was
standing. The flames shot up about 2 feet high. He
claimed to have extinguished the fire. (H. 27, 28, 29)
Then he made a torch out of a stick about as long
as his arm, around which he wrapped a piece of
cloth, with black stuff on it, which cloth he found
on the premises. (H. 15) At first it didn't burn
very well. It started and burned for about 5 minutes.
He then placed it on the ground and put the flame
out in the sand, but it was still smoking. (H. 25)
His attention was directed to the barrel. He lit a
match and held it about 5 inches where he could see
into the opening a little bit. He saw "some shiny
black, then I knew it was some kind of dangerous
stuff. Then I wanted to put that match from it,
and it exploded." (H. 5, 30) .
Robert R. Child, in his deposition, testified
that Alder-Child Company did not have a yard in
which to store their material at the time and that
they had stored some materials on Thomas Child's
premises, his father, including one or two cans of
Sealtex, a concrete curing compound. (C. 4) This
product had been used on nearly all of their building jobs. It was not necessary to ventilate in using
indoors. (C. 5) It had an asphalt smell. It did not
give off fumes. (C. 6) He had never observed any
holes in the fence surrounding his father's premises.
(C. 17) He had never seen children playing in the
yard. (C. 19)
3
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Thom~as

B. Child testified that he is a mason
contractor; has not done any general contracting;
has never been in business with his son, Robert R.
Child. His premises are enclosed by a fence. There
are no openings except gates. (C. 20) In the past
when children have come on his premises, he has
ordered them out. He has some sculptured concrete
statues, but they are not things that children play
on. (C. 22) These statues represent different characters in the Bible. It is his way of expressing his
religion and his trade in stone. (C. 23) He permits
children to come in the part of the premises where
the statues are when they are accompanied by older
people. (C. '26) He permitted his son to store equipment in the yard; did not direct his son or his employees where to put the material. He didn't see
them bring it in. He didn't store any of the material
that was in the Sealtex can. (C. 27) He had never
used material similar to the stuff in the can that
exploded. (C. 28) The drums of Sealtex were back
of the scaffolding. He didn't put them there. He
didn't know anything about the stuff. He hadn't
seen it. It was a common thing to have barrels
around. (C. 2'9) He has never used Sealtex nor seen
it used. (C. '32) He didn't know that the Sealtex
was on his place. (C. 37)
4
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY J'UDGMENT.
POINT II.
AS A MATTER OF LAW, THERE WAS NO DUTY
ON THE DEFENDANT THOMAS B. CH'ILD TO ANTICIPATE OR FORESEE THE OCCURRENCE OF THE
ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF ITS OCCURRENCE.
(a) PLAINTIFF WAS A TRESPASSER.
(b) THE DOCTRINE OF "ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE" IS NOT APIPLICABLE TO THIS
SITUATION.

ARGU·MENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY ~UDG
MENT.

Under the provisions of Rule 56, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, either party may move for Summary Judgment in his favor. The purpose of this
rule was stated in the recent case of Dupler v. Yates,
10 Utah 2d 251, 351 P. '2d 624, 636, (1960) as
follows:

''The primary purpose of the Summary
Judgment procedure is to pierce the allegations of the pleadings, show that there is no
genuine issue or of material fact, although
an issue may be raised by the pleadings, and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law."
5
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The rule further permits a Motion for Summary Judgment to be rested upon supporting affidavits and supplemented by depositions. See Tempest
v. Richardson, 5 Utah 2d 174, 299 P. 2d 124. However, affidavits relied upon in a Summary Judgment proceeding must meet specific requirements
as outlined in Rule 56 (e) :
"Supporting and opposing affidavits
shall be made on personal knowledge, shall
set forth such facts as would be admissible
in evidence, and shall show ~affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the
matters state,d therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred
to in an affidavit shall be attached thereto
or served therrwith. The court may permit
affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by
depositions or by further affidavits." (Emphasis added)
The only counteraffidavit filed in opposition
to the depositions and affidavit relied upon in support of defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
was that of Gordon I. Hyde, the plaintiff's attorney.
A somewhat detailed examination of that document
follows for the purpose of demonstrating that it
does not comply with the requirements of Rule
5'6 (e).
In paragraph 1 of the counteraffidavit, Mr.
Hyde states under oath that he "is best informed
... of the relevant facts" concerning the accident.
6
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This can only be taken to mean that after his investigation, more competent and specific testimony is
unavailable.
Paragraph 2 contains a statement to the effect
that he examined the property where the accident
took place, and that it was not "all fenced" as
alleged in the affidavit of Robert R. Child. Mr.
Hyde does not presume to know whether or not the
property was fenced at the time the accident occurred, and certainly his personal observation at
some later date is not competent. In the same paragraph, a statement is made to the effect that "children in the neighborhood customarily entered the
property" and that this fact "was known and should
have reasonably been known to all of the defeQdants." These statements are conclusionary in n·ature and do not rest upon any factual information
by individuals having specific knowledge concerning the same. They are at best allegations which
tend to expand the pleadings previously filed.
In paragraph 3 of the Counteraffidavit, Mr.
Hyde presumes to state his opinion concerning the
chemical qualities of the Sealtex compound which
was stored by the defendants on their premises without "affirmatively" showing that he was competent
to testify concerning the matters stated, as required
by Rule 56 (e). Certainly his testimony would not
be admissible in evidence at trial, because Mr. Hyde
7
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has not shown himself affirmatively qualified to
testify concerning such technical matters.
Mr. Hyde, in paragraph 4 of the Counteraffidavit, alleges that the defendants were "negligent"
because the cap on the barrel was not in place. Such
is a legal conclusion and certainly has no place in
an evidentiary affidavit under the provisions of
Rule 5'6(e).
Paragraph 5 contains assertions by Mr. Hyde
as to what was "known" by defendants, based upon
his investigation. However, other than the evidence
contained in the defendants' depositions and the
affidavit of Mr. Child, there is no other competent
testimony upon which the trial court or this court
may rely. What was known by the defendants as
testified to in their depositions is uncontroverted
by any competent evidence.
Further statements are contained in the document, to the effect that "it was perfectly obvious
to any person entering upon the property and examining it, that the cost of closing the fence would
have been nominal to the defend·ants." Such is merely a conclusionary statement concerning which Mr.
Hyde has again not affirmatively shown himself
competent to testify.
The substance of paragraph 6 of the Counteraffidavit contains further incompetent assertions
and legal conclusions. An allegation is made to the
8
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effect that "things" on the property were "attractive nuisances to children in the neighborhood."
Such is a legal conclusion without foundation in
fact.
Even a cursory review of the Counteraffidavit
will reveal that it is in the nature of an expanded
pleading in which assertions and allegations, not
founded on competent testimony, are made and upon
which a court cannot properly rest a denial of defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Frequent interpretation has been given to Rule
56 (e), Rules of Civil Procedure, which is identical
to the Utah Rule. In discussing this rule, James
William 'Moore observes:
"The affidavit, supporting or opposing,
with which we are now concerned is the evidentiary affidavit whose form and content
is governed by Rule 56 (e). This affidavit
must be on the personal knowledge of the affiant, set forth facts that would be admissible
in evidence and show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. In reference to the latter matter, if the facts stated show that the affiant
possesses the requisite competency . . .

* * *

"Mfidavits containing statements made
merely 'on information and belief' will be
disregard. Hearsay testimony and opinion
testimony that would not be admissible if
testified to at the trial may not properly be·
set forth in an affidavit. The affidavit is no
place for ultimate facts and conclusions of
9
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law, nor for arguments of the party's cause
... An attorney's affidavit not made on his
personal knowledge of the facts, but merely
stating what he believes or what he intends
to prove at the trial does not measure up to
the requirements of Rule 56(e)." 6 Moore
Federal Practice, p. 2325 to 2330, Sec. 56.22
The cases which have considered the effect and
content of affidavits filed under the provisions of
this Rule support the pronouncements of Mr. Moore.
In the case of Automatic Radio Manufacturing Co.,
Inc., v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U. S. 827, 831;
70 Sup. Ct. 894; 94 L. Ed. 1312 (1950) rehearing
denied, the Supreme Court disregarded an affidavit
of the petitioner's attorney in support of the Motion
for Summary Judgment in the following language:
''In any event, there is nothing available
in the record to support the averment, since
the affidavit in support thereof was made
upon information and belief and the relevant
portion, at least, does not comply with Rule
56 (e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.''
The United States Court of Appeal for the
District of Columbia, in the case of Jameson v. Jameson, 176 F. 2d 58, 60, (1949), speaking through
Justice Clark, stated the followin·g concerning Rule
56(e):
"This rule plainly requires (the word
'shall' being mandatory) that an affidavit
shall state matters personally known to the
affiant. A statement in such affidavit as to
10
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what the affiant 'verily believes' does not satisfy this require1nent. Belief, no matter how
sincere, is not equivalent to knowledge. It is
further required that the facts set forth in
the affidavit be such as would be admissible
in evidence should they be given from the witness stand during trial of the case. The statements in the appellant's affidavit which we
have outlined above would, if given as testimony, be clearly objectionable as being hearsay. As one Federal court put it:
'Mfidavits filed by party in support
of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must present evidence.
The affidavits should follow substantially the same form as though the affiant were giving testimony in court.' "
Quoting D. C. Del. 1942, Seward, et ~al, v.
Nissen, et al, 2 F. R. D. 545, 546.
In reviewing the decision of the trial court,
which granted defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment in the case of Richards v. Anderson, 9
Utah 2d 17; 337 P. 2d 59, 61, (19'5'9), our Supreme
Court, in sustaining the Trial Court, stated :
''In the ·absence of any other record, it
stands unassailed as reflecting the facts presented to the court. If the plaintiff contends
to the contrary, he has the burden of bringing the record here to show otherwise, because
the burden is upon the appellant to show
error."
Thus, the ·appellant is required, on this appeal,
to rely upon competent testimony presented to the
trial court if he is to succeed in this proceeding. The
11
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burden is upon him to show error and to produce
a record containing competent testimony which will
support his ,allegations. This the defendant has failed
to do.
The effect of failing to properly controvert
matters presented at summary judgment is discussed in the recent case of Dupler v. Yates, 10 Utah
2d 251, 351, P. 2d 624, ( 1960). There a motion for
summary judgment was granted upon inference,
arising in the pleadings that the plaintiffs had been
fully compensated for damages which they sought
against one of the defendants. The plaintiffs made
no affirmative showing with respect to this issue,
although counteraffidavits were filed concerning
another ,case. The Supreme Court, in reviewing the
state of the pleadings, observed:
"We then h·ave an unverified amended
complaint aligned against admissible evidence
in support of motion for summary judgment
and which is uncontroverted, would entitle the
defendant to judgment as ·a matter of law."

* * *

''It is apparent here that the defendants
had produced evidence that pierces the allegations of the complaint. The plaintiffs have
not controverted, explained or destroyed the
evidence by counteraffidavit or otherwise.
They have relied upon their amended complaint and their proposed amendment to the
amended ·Complaint.
''Certainly if summary judgment procedure is to be effective, it must be held that
when adequ·ate proof is submitted in support
12
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of the motion, the pleadings are not sufficient
to raise an issue of fact."
It is respectfully subn1itted that, in the instant
case, the counteraffidavit of Mr. Hyde should be
disregarded, inasmuch as it does not comply with
the requirements of Rule 56 (e), as to the form of
the affidavit and presents no competent evidence
upon which this court should rely. Under the decided cases, such testimony is not admissible at trial
and cannot properly be considered here. Thus, the
testimony which was presented by defendants in
support of their Motion for Summary Judgment in
the trial court was, and remains uncontroverted.
The trial court did not err in granting defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment.
POINT II.
AS A MATTER 'OF LAW, THERE WAS NO DUTY
ON THE DEFENDANT THOMAS B. CHILD TO ANTICIPATE OR FORESEE THE OCC·URRENCE OF THE
ACCIDENT OR THE PROBABILITY OF ITS OCCURRENCE.
(a) PLAINTIFF WAS A TRESPASSER.
(b) THE DOCTRINE OF "ATTRACTIVE NUISANCE" IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS
SITUATION.

('a) The accident occurred in the afternoon,
while school was in session. Eddie h·ad sloughed and
had entered the insured's premises without permission. Thomas Child testified that children were not
permitted on any part of the premises, except when
13
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they were accomp·anied by their p·arents; in such instances they were permitted on the part of the premises where the concrete monuments were, to the
south of where the accident happened. The area
was enclosed by a fence varying in height from 4
to 6 feet. Access to the premises was by two gates,
which were generally not locked. (C. 20, 21) If he
ever noticed any openings or damage to the fencing,
he repaired it. (C. ·33) On the north end the
fence did extend to some sheds. On occasion, children
had made an opening between the shed and the
fence, which he had repaired whenever observed.
(C. 34) There had never been a prior accident in
his yard. Child said that whenever children were
observed on the premises, they were ordered off,
·and that on some occasions he had called the police.
Eddie Hoogland entered the premises through
a small place that he had to go through sideways.
(C. 11, 19) After entering, he testified he saw a
man "come out and he just hid behind something."
( H.20) So he knew that he was tresp·assing at the
time. There is no evidence that the area was used
as a playground by children or that they habitually
traversed the area. The evidence is undisputed that
Eddie's status was th·at of a trespasser.

The Doctrine of "Attractive Nuisance"
Is Not Applicable to This Sit'Uation.
The doctrine of attractive nuisance is not ap(b)

14
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plicable to this situation. As has been stated, the
premises to the rear of Thomas Child's home are
divided into two parts. On the south half he has located the concrete statues or monuments depicting
Biblical scenes and characters. As he said in his
deposition, this is 'a hobby by which he expresses
his religion through knowledge obtained in his trade.
On the north half of the area he had stored his mixing equipment and certain other building materials.
In addition, he permitted Alder-Child Construction
Company to store building materials there. Robert
Child, a partner of the company, is his son; but there
is no business connection or other relationship between them. Material stored by Alder-Child consisted mostly of stacked lumber and two 53-gallon
drums of Sealtex, a concrete curing compound, which
were located near the north end of the lumber. There
were also two cement mixers located southeast of
the two drums and one to the east of them. There
was nothing unusual about these materials and these
cement mixers, which were commonplace equipment.
The drums were black metal containers, with no
marking of any kind on the outside.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that, if the
owner leaves or maintains something upon his
premises under circumstances which naturally tend
to attract or allure young children of imm·ature
judgment and to induce them to believe that they
15
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are 'at liberty to enter and handle or play with it,
there is in effect an invitation to them to come upon
the premises. Brown v. Salt Lake City, 33 Utah 222,
93 Pac. 570; Smalley v. Rio Grande Western Rail.
road Comp,any, 34 Utah 423, 98 Pac. 311, and the
instrument must not only be dangerous and attractive, but the circumstances of leaving and maintainit must also be such ·as to induce young children to
believe that they are at liberty to enter and h'andle
or play abotlt it. Smalley v. Rio Grande Western
R~ailroad Company, supra.
~

In Brown v. Salt Lake City, supra, the child
was drowned in a water conduit located near an
elementary grade school. The evidence showed th'at
for a considerable period of time before the accident,
children had played in and about the conduit, and
that delegations of citizens had complained to the
city of the danger. The Supreme Court held that
the question of whether the City was negligent in
leaving unguarded the entrance to the conduit was
for the jury and affirmed a plaintiff's verdict.
In the case of S??Wlley v. Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company, supra, the Court refused to apply the doctrine when a plaintiff of 5 ye~ars of age,
who, with his brother, 8 years of age, while playing
in the def~ndant's railroad yards, was struck by a
car which had been "kicked" by a switch engine,
and which the boy attempted to board while in mo16
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tion. The Court there observed at page 319 that:
"It is not the keeping or leaving of all
kinds of dangerous and attractive machines
or other instruments upon premises that renders the owner or occupant liable if he does
not take precautions to guard or protect them,
or to prevent intrusions and un·authorized
visits of children. The instrument or agency
must not only be dangerous and attractive,
but the circumstances of leaving and maintaining it must also be such as to induce young
children to believe that they are .at liberty to
enter .and handle or play about it. That is, it
must be made to appear, either from the character of the instrument or agency itself, or
from the manner and circumstances under
which it was m·aintained or left about the
premises, or from other conduct on the part
of the owner or occupant of the premises, that
an inducement or its equivalent was held out
to young children to enter.'' (Italics supplied)
The plaintiff urged that there was ·a duty of
lookout imposed upon the defendant because its employees knew that children played in the area. The
Court in commenting upon this allegation, commented as follows:
"Before it can be urged that the employees were required to observe a lookout
and to operate and m·anage the cars about
the yard with reference to the plaintiff's presence, it must first be made to appear that
they owed a duty in the premises to use care
. . . For every case of actionable negligence
involves a duty to use care, and a breach of
such duty resulting in injttry." ·(Italics supplied)
17
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Under the circumstances presented in the case,
the Court found that there was no duty owing on
the part of the defendant's employees to exercise
care in the handling of cars about the yard until
the plaintiff was discovered. The Court further
stated at p'age 320:
"It was not the manner in which the car
was operated that caused it to collide with
the plaintiff, or that caused the plaintiff coming in con tact with it. The direct cause of his
coming in contact with the car was his taking
hold of the car and attempting to ride on it
without the knowledge or consent of defendant's employees. While a child, because of
its age, cannot be regar.ded as a conscious
trespasser, nor held chargeable of contributory
negligence, nevertheless, the consequences of
its acts cannot be charged to the defendtlnt.
The conduct of the child was in no sense influenced or induced by any act or conduct
on the part of the defendant or its employees,
nor was the injury occasioned because of any
negligence on their part. We are of the opinion
th'at the court was justified in directing a
verdict in favor of the defendant." (Italics
supplied)
The attractiveness must be shown to have been
the proximate cause of the injury Charvoz v. Salt
Lake City, 42 Utah 455, 131 Pac. 901. In this case
the Court held that a small stre'am of mineral water
flowing into a ditch, through a culvert, was not,
because it was warm, an attractive nuisance under
the doctrine of the "turntable cases" so as to render
18
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the City liable for the death of a child 17 months
old, who was found dead in the ditch by the child's
mother.
In reviewing the evidence, the Court pointed
to the fact that there was no evidence to show that
the dece~ased child, or any child for that matter, was
attracted by the water- flowing in the ditch in question. In the absence of testimony to this effect, the
Court observed that:
"The presumption, or inference, is therefore th·at the deceased child, as well as other
children in the neighborhood, followed their
natural childish propensities of playing in the
stream of water is absolutely dissipated or
overcome. There is therefore neither direct nor
inferential evidence in support of the implied
finding that the deceased child was attracted
by the warm water flowing in the .ditch."
(Italics supplied)
The Court also observed that there was no showing that the attractiveness of the water was the
proximate cause of the child's death. The Court, in
discussing this principle, stated:
"That the attractiveness must be shown
to have been the proximate cause is clearly
illustrated by the Supreme Court of Illinois
in the very recent case entitled McDermott v.
Burke, 256 Ill. 407, 100 N. E. 170, where the
Court s·aid :
'Another essential condition to liability is that the attractive thing, or something inseparably connected with it, must
19
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be the proximate cause of the injury.' "
(Italics supplied)
In the case of Payne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar (/ompany, 62 Utah 598, 221 Pac. 568, defendant had
constru·cted a sugar beet dump on the railroad right
of way. This was a device for unloading sugar beets
from the farmers' wagons into the cars on the railroad track. Above the platform upon which the
wagons were driven for unloading, a scaffold was
erected over 'and across which cables were extended,
which, upon the side immediately adjoining the location of the spur track, were fastened to and intended to raise and lower a screen or chute over
which the beets were passed before falling into the
railroad car. The cables passed over the pulleys at
the top of and on each side of the scaffold. The beet
dump was located in a sparsely settled area, but
frequently children accomp'anied their fathers in
hauling beets; and while the unloading was in progress, played around the structure and climbed up
and down the ladder to the side of it, and slid down
the c'ables above referred to, all of which was observed by the employees of the sugar company. One
afternoon the plaintiff, 'aged 14, climbed down a
ladder while his companion slid down one of the
cables to the ground. The boys began swinging the
cables back and forth, when one of the cables got
out of the pulley at the top, and in attempting to
replace it, it came in contact with ~a high-tension
20
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wire belonging to another company; and the plaintiff was injured. Plaintiff had judgment in the court
below. It was contended that the doctrine of "attractive nuisance" applied. On ·appeal, the case was
reversed 'and remanded for new trial.
In denying application of the doctrine, the
Court asserted that under the evidence:
"We believe that the structure involved
here was not shown to be either novel in character or attractive or dangerous to children,
within the meaning of the Utah cases. It was
no more novel in character th·an a cattle-loa.ding chute or a water tank upon a railroad
right of way; ·and it is not shown to have been
any more attractive or dan·gerous than such
structures might be. Even though we assume
that it was ·attractive as a coasting place, or
a place over which to race horses, that it had
been so used by children, ·and that the defendant was charged with notice that it was
attractive to boys ·and girls for such purposes,
still there is not the slightest suggestion in
the evidence that the structure was at all
dangerous when so used. The injury sustained
by the pla·intijf was from a use which no
reasonable man could or would have anticipated and from a use to which no child is
shown to have theretofore put it.
" . . . As to him (plaintiff), the loose
hanging cables did not constitute an attraction, for with apparent deliberation he chose
not to use the cables for the purpose of sliding down them, as his associate did a few moments before the accident. Not until his com21
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panion had discovered that the cable had come
off the pulley and not until his companion had
failed in his efforts to replace it, did the plaintiff concern himself with the cable at all, and
then, when he did concern himself with it, he
did with the cable that which the defendant
certainly could never have anticip·ated that
he or any other boy or girl would do with it.
He swun·g it outward in an attempt to flip
it back upon its pulley, and swung it so far
that it came in contact with the electric wire
of the power line, over which the defendant
had no supervision or control, and which was
outside of the right of way upon which the
defendant's structure was built. It certainly
cannot be said that his conduct was that of
a child of immature years attracted to a dangerous instrumentality maintained by the defendant so as to bring him within the doctrine
of the decision of this court hereinbefore referred to. Nor can it be said that the circumstances of the accident were such that the
defendant might reasonably h·ave anticipated
them, and so have been required to guard
against them.
''... The plaintiff was not attracted to
the structure by reason of the loose h·anging
cables, and when he re·ached the structure,
he was not attracted to them by any appeal
that they made to his childish instincts. There
is no evidence that any other child at any time
was attracted by and amused itself with the
cables, except that it does appear that plaintiff's companion safely slid down one of the
cables immediately before the accident, and
there is not the slightest suggestion in the evidence that sliding down the cables was at all
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dangerous. At any rate, the plaintiff was not
attracted by the cable as a thing to slide down
upon, nor was he injured in so doing. He was
not injured until he m·ade use of the cable in
a most unusual and extraordinary way, and
used it in such ·a way that it cannot possibly
be said that the defendant might have reasonably anticipated such use." (Italics supplied)
See also Peterson v. ~armers, 69 Utah 395, 2'55
Pac. 436, in which the Court reversed a verdict in
favor of a plaintiff aged 7 ye·ars who was injured
when he got upon a manlift in an elevator building,
caused the lift to rise, 'and a rope broke, permitting
the elevator to fall to the floor. The Court stated
at page 398 of the Utah report:
"In support of the judgment, the plaintiff relies upon the doctrine of attractive nuisance or the turntable cases. This doctrine
is to the general effect that under certain
circumstances it is action·able negligence to
leave on one's premises an ungu·arded, dangerous thing to which children ·are likely to
be attracted for sport or play. This rule of
liability is subject to numerous limitations
and needs very careful statement not to make
it an unjust and impractical requirement;
and the principle, if accepted, must be cautiously applied. In one of these cases only was
liability upheld. In the other four it was denied." (Italics supplied). (All ~ases referred
to are Utah cases and have heretofore been
discussed. )
The foregoing decisions hold that before the
doctrine of attractive nuisance can apply:
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1. The instrumentality which injures the child
must itself be so attractive to children of immature
years that its existence or m·aintenance on the owner's premises must constitute an implied invitation
to children or persons of immature years to enter
the premises, which the owner in the exercise of
reasonable care should foresee.
The instrumentality must be inherently
dangerous, which must be known to the owner of the
premises.
3. The instrumentality must have been the
proximate cause of the accident and resulting injury.
Eddie testified that he did not see these cans
until after he was on the premises. (H. 11) Obviously they did not attract him. There was nothing
unusual or attractive about the drums. They were
composed of black metal, with no outside markings
indic·ating the contents were flamm·able or explosive.
They could have contained water or ·any of anumber of substances. The drums are commonplace,
frequently seen around service stations, dumps, or
construction areas. Many are commonly used as
trash containers. There was noting to put the defendant, Thomas Child, on notice th·at Eddie might
be attracted to the can and hold a lighted match to
the opening. Payne v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company,
supra.
2.

In St. Louis I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Waggoner, 112
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Ark. 593, 166 S. W. 948, it was held that the attractive nuisance doctrine h·ad no application in a case
where a 10-year-old boy removed the stopper from
an empty alcohol barrel on the platform of the railroad station of its destination, and placed a lighted
match at the vent, causing an explosion of gas
formed from the small amount of liquid left in it,
although the barrel had a caution tag on the end
on which it was standing, placed on the b·arrel when
it was full and not required on empty barrels, the
Court concluding that the railroad company could
not reasonably anticipate that dangerous explosives
would, under the circumstan~ces, be produced, or
that children would be attracted to the barrel and
m'ake a plaything of it, or that they would do what
they actually did do.
The Sealtex was a commercial product used
extensively by Alder-Child Company in their construction business. They had never heard of any
fire, danger, or explosion involving the use of the
product.
A number of courts recognize that one who
stores upon his premises an inherently dangerous
substance, such as dynamite, or dynamite caps, cannot avoid liability to trespassin'g children, who obtain such substances and explode them to their injury, where the owner is charged with knowledge
of probable presence of children on his premises but
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nevertheless stores such substances in such manner
as to be accessible to children. The courts also have
held th'at some substances~ such as gasoline, cannot
be classified as inherently dangerous. In the case
of Flaherty v. Metro Stations, 196 N. Y. 8.2 affirmed without Op. 235 N. Y. 605, 139 N. E. 753,
it was held that a landlord could not be held liable
for injuries to a 7-year-old child, who, with companions of about the same age, obtained gasoline
from an open can on defendant's premises, the can
being used to catch drippings from the hose used
in filling truck tanks, spilled some of the substance
on his clothes, which later ignited when one of his
companions threw a can of such gasoline upon fire.
The court said:
''The doctrine of attractive nuisance on
private property is in my opinion no part of
the law of this State. A principle, however,
analo~ous to that requiring wild anim'als and
fire to be kept at one's peril seems applicable
to the keeping of high explosives such as dynamite. I do not find the rule ·as yet extended
to electric wires; further, I would not be inclined to class gasoline ·at the present time
as a dangerous explosive, (like dynamite or
powder). Though somewhat volatile and highly inflammable, it has come into such common
use as to be classed rather as one of the everyday necessities of modern life, concerning the
keeping of which no higher responsibility
should be imposed."
In Burley v. 1Y.lcDowell, 133 Colo., 5'81, 298 P.2
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399, the Colorado Supreme Court held that where
a 9-year-old boy was injured while playing with dedefendant's child on defendant's premises, when
burned by gasoline which the boys had unauthorizedly procured from another building on the premises,
and ignited it by a candle on the boy's toy boat, that
the defendant was not guilty of negligence and
could not be held to a duty to anticipate the child's
actions. The ease was tried to the judge without a
jury. The Supreme Court affirmed his decision and
inferred that defendant was not negligent as a matter of law.
Thomas Child was not present when the drums
were brought to his place. (C. 27) He was unaware
of the contents. (C. 29, 37) He had never used the
product in his business.
In Bogden v. Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railway
Company, 59 Utah 505, 205 Pac. 571, the Utah Supreme Court held the existence of the dangerous
substance must be known to the defendant. In this
decision, a railroad company was held not liable
for injuries to ·a boy from the explosion of powder
which the boy found in one of its boxcars, when
powder was left in the car by a consignee, who unloaded it a short time before the ·accident, and the
railroad campany had no knowledge that it was in
the car.
"Again, the defendant h·ad nothing to
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do with the dangerous thing except to transport it with due circumspection and care so as
to injure no one who was where he had a
right to be. Moreover, in view that nothing
of a similar nature had ever occurred before,
the defendant had 'a right to assume that the
consignee had performed its duty and had
removed all the powder from the car. In that
regard it cannot be charged with negligence
until it knew or was put upon notice that
some powder was left in the car. While ordinarily the question of whether a person
knew, or ought to have known, of a particular fact is a question of fact for the jury,
yet when, as here, there is no dispute concerning the facts, and there is absolutely
nothing upon which such a finding or conclusion ·Could be based, the question is one of law,
as was held in the Smalley Case. The following
cases are directly in point, and fully support
the doctrine laid down in Smalley v. Railroad
and Charvoz v. Salt Lake City, supra; Barney
v. H. & St. Joe Ry. Co., 126 Mo. 372, 28 S. W.
1069, 26 L. R. A. 847; Kelley v. Benas, 217
Mo. 1, 116 S. W. 557, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.)
903.
"There is nothing in this case whieh
would authorize a finding th,at the plaintiff
was enticed, lured, or attracted by ·anything
the defendant did or omitted to do to the
car in question, and hence the case clearly and
manifestly does not come within the doctrine
of the turntable cases or that of attractive
nuisance."
On the question of whether the railroad company was negligent in storing dangerous explosives,
the court said:
28
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"It is only where a higly explosive substance or other dangerous instrumentality is
knowingly placed in a public place where
people, including children, have a right to
be, or where such a substance or instrumentality or agency is knowingly placed or left
'in the way that he (the owner) knows the
licensee - a child of tender years - is habit~~ally ~accustomed to go, and where an ordinarily prudent person would reasonably expect
him to go, and be thereby injured,' that creates liability. (Italics ours) When the elements that are there stated as constituting the
basis of liability are contr·asted with the undisputed facts in the case at bar, we have not
the slightest hesitancy in saying that the
decision in that case does not justify a recovery in the case at blar. The slightest reflection will make clear that the elements
there stated are entirely lacking in this case."
It is submitted that the hazard of blasting
powder is much greater than that of Sealtex.
Was Thom·as Child, in the exercise of reasonable care, required to inspect the premises to ascer~
tain that the contents of the drum was Sealtex? According to Prosser, Second Edition, pp. 445:
"All courts appear to agree, that the
occupier is not required to use care to provide
a safe place to trespassers by inspecting the
premises to discover possible dangers of which
he is not ·aware."
Representative of these decisions is the case of
Rush v. Plains Township, a decision of the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, found at 371 Pa. 117, 89
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Atl.2 200 This case involved an action by a minor,
through his guardian, for a personal injury received
when he was burned at a dump, owned and operated
by the Township. The minor, aged 7, went to the
dump with his brother, to get some funny books.
The facts revealed th·at the dump was used by the
townspeople as well as the officials of the Township itself. A fire was burning approximately 30
feet from the place where the minor was injured.
He walked onto the dump, across the surface, which
appeared to be solid, but through which he fell up
to his neck. He was severely burned by coals which
were smoldering underneath.
The evidence showed that fires had been burning on the dump for several years and that the
Township authorities should have known that children would and did play there. The trial court granted
a nonsuit, and its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The decision is based
upon Section 339 of the Restatement of the Law of
Torts, which has been adopted ·as the law in Pennsylvania, and it reads as follows:
"A possessor of land is subject to liability for bodily harm to young children tresp·assing thereon caused by a structure or
other artificial condition which he maintains
upon the land if (a) the place where the
condition is 1naintained is one upon which
the possessor knows or should have known
that such children are likely to trespass, and
30
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(b) the condition is one which the possessor
knows or should know and which he realizes
or should realize as involving an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to
such children, and (c) the children, because
of their youth, do not discover the condition or
realize the risk involved in intermeddling in
it or coming within the ·area made dangerous
by it, and (d) the utility to the possessor of
maintaining the condition is slight as compared to the risk to young children involved
therein."
The opinion contains the following language:
"We agree with the contention of plaintiff that the Township should, under the testimony, have known that children were likely
to trespass upon this ground, but we disagree
with their contention that the Township
should have realized that the place where the
accident occurred involved ·an unreasonable
risk of death or serious bodily harm to trespassing children. If plaintiff's injuries had
occurred at the place where the fire was or
had been burning, a different question would
have been presented; but since the injury occurred in a part of the ,dump where there
w~as no fire ~and no evidence that prior to the
accident there had been any fire, and since it
was clearly and indisputably a latent condition of which the defendant ,did not have any
actual knowledge or constructive notice, plaintiff connot recover." ·(Italics supplied)
In the instant case, the facts are clear that
the condition which brought about injury was a
latent condition of which the defendant did not
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have any actual knowledge or constructive notice;
and the plaintiff, therefore, should not recover
against the defendant, Thomas B. Child.
Another case illustrative of the same proposition arose in the State of Pennsylvania and was
tried in the U. S. District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania and appealed to the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The case is
Kravetz v. B. Perini & Sons, 2·52 Fed. 2 905. In this
case the minor, aged 8% years, was injured near
his home by falling from construction on a freeway
interchange.· The trial court granted an involuntary
nonsuit, and its decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court.
Since the law of Pennsylvania applied, and the
jurisdiction has adopted the rule stated and previously quoted from the Restatement of Torts, the
decision is also based upon the principle announced
in the Restatement. At page 908 of that decision,
the court uses the following language in referring
to a comment from the Restatement about Section
339:
"The restatement states that the rule
does not require him (the possessor of land)
to keep his land free from conditions which
even young children are likely to observe and
the full extent of the risk involved ·and which
they are likely to realize. The purpose of the
duty is to protect children from dangers which
they ·are unlikely to appreciate and not to protect them against harm resulting from their
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own immature recklessness in the case of
known danger."
Another case treating particularly the lack of
obligation on the landowner's part to inspect the
premises periodically for the purpose of determining whether dangerous artificial conditions exist
thereon is the case of Simmel v. New Jersey Co-op
Company, a decision of the Supreme Court of New
Jersey found at 28 N. J. 1, 143 Atl.2 521. In this
case the defendant owned or had recently purchased
a lot across the street from the home of the infant
who was injured, which had for some time prior
thereto been used as a junk yard and dumping place
by people in the general neighborhood. The infant,
aged 4, wandered across the street, stumbled on
some junk which was on fire, and was burned. The
testimony was that the vacant lot had been used
as a dump for rubbish and debris some time prior
to the accident; that its potential dangers were recognized by the residents of the neighborhood. The
evidence further showed that there were fires on
the premises every day, or practically every day,
and the children were constantly playing in the lot
or cutting across it on their way to school.
From a judgment on a jury verdict in the plaintiff's favor, the appeal was prosecuted and the case
was sent b·ack for a new trial, based upon the instructions relating to the question of actual knowl33
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edge. In the instant case there is no actual or constructive knowledge. However, in the decision, the
court employs the following language:
"It should be recognized, however, that
the landowner or occupier is not an insurer of
the infant. He has no duty to periodically inspect the premises in order to ascertain
whether third persons, themselves trespassers, might have created dangerous artificial
conditions thereon. The maintenance here is
alleged to consist of toleration or sufferance
of or acquiescence in the acts of others; but
before the defendant can be said to have so
endured the other's conduct, he must have
actual knowledge of the condition created by
third persons unrelated to him.''
Even though Alder and Child Construction Company were not trespassers, in that they had stored
the Sealtex on the premises, with Thomas Child's
permission, the principle of this decision is applicable, inasmuch as Child had no actual or constructive knowledge that the metal drum contained Sealtex. In storing the material on the premises, AlderChild were licensees ; there was no legal or business
relationship between that company and the defendant, Thomas Child. The Sealtex was not dangerous
to the plaintiff until he made it so by holding a
match near the opening. The hazard was created
by him. There is evidence that Eddie was in a special
class at school, may have been somewhat retarded
as comp:ared to other members of his regular class.
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However, he was aware that he was on Thomas
Child's premises without permission; when he saw
a man come out "he just hid behind something."
(H. 20) He had seen cans like the Sealtex drum
before, "the stuff inside they use for road oil."
(H. 18) When he lighted the match an·d looked in
the barrel, he saw some shiny black stuff which
he knew was dangerous. (H. 30) Ap·parently he did
not habitually carry matches, because he bought a
box before going on the premises. (H. 15)
There are some dangers common in the community which any child of sufficient ·age to be allowed at large may be expected to understand and
appreciate, such as the usual risks of fire. In Payne
v. Utah-Idaho Sugar Company, supra, the Supreme
Court expressed doubt whether the '''attractive nuis·ance" doctrine was applicable to that accident,
which resulted in injury to a 12lf2-year-old boy.
Certainly Eddie appreciated the possible hazard involved, and his act in lighting the match was
the sole proximate cause of this unfortunate accident. His statement to the police ·after the ·accident
that some older boy had thrust a stick into the barrel
was an attempt to divest himself of blame and shows
an awareness of wrongdoing. '(Louisa Hoogland
deposition ·H. 38)
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CONCLUSION
In addition to the authorities herein cited, defendant Thomas Child relies upon any pertinent
authorities cited in the Brief of Alder-Child relevant to his position. It is respectfully submitted that
the uncontradicted testimony as shown in the deposition establishes as a matter of law:
1. That plaintiff was a tresp·asser, to which
the defendant, Thomas Child, owed no duty, because:
(a) The doctrine of "attractive nuisance"
as a matter of law does not apply to this situation;
(b) Thomas Child was unaware of the
contents of the metal drums; and under the circumstances was under no obligation to know what the.
drums contained;
(c) That Sealtex was not inherently dangerous; did not attract the minor to the premises,
and was not the proximate cause of his injuries; the
hazard was created by the plaintiff.
In the exercise of reasonable care, was Thomas
Child required to anticipate that Eddie Hoogland
would enter his premises without invitation and
thereafter be attracted to an ordinary-looking metal
drum, the contents of which Mr. Child had no knowledge, and hold ·a match to the opening, which would
cause an explosion? To hold Child to such a stand36
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arcl of care would not only make him a guarantor
against accidents but require clairvoyance.
The Motion for Summary Judgment in favor
of Thomas B. Child was properly granted.
Respectfully submitted,
HANSON, BALDWIN & ALLEN
REX J. HANSON
Attorneys for Defendant,
Thomas B. Child
5t5 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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